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Coleman-McKinney: Criminal Procedure

GRANGER V. STATE: EXAMINING WHAT
CONSTITUTES "NOTICE" FOR PURPOSES OF
THE SUFFICIENCY OF AN INDICTMENT AND THE

STANDARD OF PROOF ON ISSUES OF
FACT AT SENTENCING
I.

INTRODUCTION

Sentencing of criminal defendants is a serious matter. The
precariousness of individual liberty necessitates the safeguards of due process.
Recently, in Grangerv. State' the South Carolina Supreme Court considered
whether an indictment is sufficient to place a criminal defendant on notice of
the charges against him. In its decision, the court upheld the wording of an
indictment charging the defendant with trafficking more than ten grams as
"sufficient to put Granger on notice of the charge he had to meet, i.e.,
trafficking," 2 although the actual amount "revealed" at sentencing was 58.44
grams The finding by the trial judge at sentencing of the greater quantity of
cocaine had a significant effect on the potential sentencing range, increasing it
from a range of three to ten years in prison and a fine of $25,000 to a range of
seven to twenty-five years and a fine of $50,000 for a conviction for trafficking
twenty-eight to 100 grams.4 Implicitly the court affirmed judicial findings of
fact at sentencing by a standard, if any, below that afforded to criminal
defendants at trial-beyond a reasonable doubt.
This Comment suggests that the indictment in question was
insufficient to put Granger on notice of the charges against him insofar as more
than minimal statutory language is necessary to inform defendants of the
charges facing them. Other courts have suggested simple ways to inform
defendants of the potential punishment range by specifying the statutory
subsection in the indictment relating to the quantity of drugs.5 This Comment
explores the potential due process problems associated with judicial findings
of fact at sentencing and the need for an evidentiary standard for making such
determinations beyond mere preponderance of the evidence. Part II summarizes
the facts and the court's reasoning in Granger.Part Im analyzes the court's
justification for finding that the indictment was sufficient to put Granger on
notice of the charges facing him and criticizes the court's reliance on State v.

1. 333 S.C. 2, 507 S.E.2d 322 (1998).
2. Id. at 5, 507 S.E.2d at 324.
3. Id. at 3, 507 S.E.2d at 323.
4. Id. at 4 n.2, 507 S.E.2d at 323 n.2.
5. See, e.g., Darby v. State, 516 So. 2d 775, 780 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986), rev'd on
other grounds, 516 So. 2d 786 (Ala. 1987).
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Towery.6 Part I also evaluates the harshness of the court's decision insofar as
had Granger's indictment been amended at sentencing, the case would have
come out differently under Clair v. State7 because increasing the potential
penalty through amending the indictment would involve changing the nature
of the offense. Finally, Part IV focuses on the court's implicit support for
judicial findings of fact at sentencing. The trial judge's finding of the actual
amount of cocaine in this case is analogous to the practice in the federal courts
of real offense sentencing under sentencing guidelines and raises similar
concerns about the proper standard for making judicial determinations of fact
at sentencing. Because of the inadequacies of the preponderance standard for
safeguarding a defendant's due process rights, Part IV also explores the issues
and arguments in favor of a higher standard for findings of fact at sentencing.
H.

BACKGROUND

Charles Granger, Jr., was indicted for trafficking crack cocaine. 8
According to the indictment, Granger "'was knowingly in actual or
constructive possession of more than ten (10)grams of Crack Cocaine. This is
in violation of South Carolina Code of Laws § 44-53-375. '' Granger pled
guilty to the indictment as stated.'" At the plea hearing, the actual quantity of
crack Granger had trafficked, 58.44 grams, was revealed." Upon advising
Granger that his potential sentence would now range from seven to twenty-five
years (as he was now to be punished for possession of between twenty-eight to
100 grams instead often to twenty-eight3 grams), 2 the judge sentenced him to
fifteen years for the trafficking charge.
Granger filed for post conviction relief arguing that the indictment's
language charging him with trafficking more than ten grams notified him only
that he was charged with trafficking between ten and twenty-eight grams of
crack cocaine and that he faced the lesser penalty of three to ten years and a

6. 300 S.C. 86, 87,386 S.E.2d 462,462-63 (1989) (upholding indictment that made
no mention of the quantity of cocaine).
7. 324 S.C. 144, 146,478 S.E.2d 54,55 (1996) (holding that an amended indictment
raising the penalty divests a court of subject matter jurisdiction).
8. Granger,333 S.C. at 3, 507 S.E.2d at 323.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-375(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998) (delineating
sanctions for the following quantity ranges: 10 to 28 grams in subsection (C)(1)(a)-(c), 28 to less
than 100 grams in subsection (C)(2)(a)-(c), 100 to less than 200 grams in subsection (C)(3), 200
to less than 400 grams in subsection (C)(4), and 400 grams or more in subsection (C)(5)).
13. Granger,333 S.C. at 3, 507 S.E.2d at 323.
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fine of $25,000.' 4 The circuit court agreed and found the indictment was
insufficient to put Granger on notice that he could face a more severe sentence
and then remanded the case for resentencing. 5
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court's
findings by first determining that the indictment met the standards for
sufficiency. 6 The court unequivocally stated that "[a]n indictment is sufficient
if it apprises the defendant of the elements of the offense intended to be
charged and apprises the defendant what he must be prepared to meet."' 7 The
Grangercourt also noted that punishment is not "part of the pleading charging
a crime."' 8 Taken together, these statements reveal that while a defendant is
entitled to have the elements of the offense set forth in the indictment, a
defendant is not entitled to know from the indictment itself what the potential
punishment will be.
In holding that Granger was on notice of the charged offense vis-a-vis
the indictment, the court relied principally on its holding in State v. Towery."9
In Towery the court found sufficient an indictment in which the State failed to
specify a quantity of cocaine.2" The indictment alleged simply that the
defendant 'did traffic in cocaine by willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
having in his possession a quantity of cocaine."'2 1 Because of the Towery
holding, the Grangercourt found the indictment at issue also sufficient.'
The court further supported its holding by distinguishing Granger
from cases dealing with amended indictments that changed the nature of the
underlying offense. 3 For instance, in Hopkins v. State24 an amendment to an
indictment changing the offense from felony driving under the influence
causing great bodily harm to felony driving under the influence causing death
changed the nature of the offense because there was an increase in punishment
from ten to twenty-five years? 5 The common denominator of cases like

14. Id. at 3-4, 507 S.E.2d at 323.
15. Id. at 4, 507 S.E.2d at 323.
16. Id. at 4-5, 507 S.E.2d at 323-24.
17. Id. at 4, 507 S.E.2d at 323 (citing State v. Evans, 322 S.C. 78, 81,470 S.E.2d 97,
98 (1996)).
18. Id. at 5 n.3, 507 S.E.2d at 324 n.3; see also State v. Butler, 277 S.C. 452,457,290
S.E.2d 1, 3 (1982) (concluding punishment "is not and never has been considered a part of the
pleading charging a crime").
19. Granger,333 S.C. at4,507 S.E.2d at 323-24 (relying on State v. Towery, 300
S.C. 86, 386 S.E.2d 462 (1989)).
20. Towery, 300 S.C. at 87, 386 S.E.2d at 463.
21. Id. at 87, 386 S.E.2d at 462 (emphasis added).
22. Granger,333 S.C. at 4, 507 S.E.2d at 324.
23. Id. at 5, 507 S.E.2d at 324.

24. 317 S.C. 7,451 S.E.2d 389 (1994).
25. Id. at 8-9,451 S.E.2d at 389-90; see also State v. Riddle, 301 S.C. 211,212, 391
S.E.2d 253,253 (1990) (holding that an amendment to an indictment for "assault with intent to
commit third degree criminal sexual conduct to the greater charge of assault with intent to
commitfirst degree criminal sexual conduct" was improper as it increased the penalty from a
maximum of 10 years to a maximum of 30 years).
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Hopkins is that if the amendment increases the potential penalty, it changes the
nature of the offense and is an improper indictment. The court blithely
distinguished Hopkins and other similar cases by noting that Granger's
indictment was not amended.
Finally, the court went to great lengths to distinguish Clairv. State,27
a very recent and factually similar case.28 The court's key distinction between
the cases was that the indictment in Clair was amended from trafficking in
cocaine weighing more than 100 grams and less than 200 grams to an amount
more than 200 grams and less than 400 grams.29 According to the Granger
court, "[t]he critical difference between Clairand the present case.., is that
Granger's indictment does not state that Granger was charged with trafficking
less than 28 grams of crack."3' Had the indictment in Grangerbeen amended
to reflect a greater quantity of crack cocaine, the court would have treated the
amendment as improper under Clair, and thus, the court would have lacked
subject matter jurisdiction.

III.

ANALYSIS
A.

Insufficient Notice

An examination of the case law dealing with sufficiency of indictments
shows that the Grangercourt ignored many standard requirements found in
previous decisions. In Carterv.State32 the court explained that "[a]n indictment
is sufficient if the offense is stated with sufficient certainty and particularity to
enable the court to know what judgment to pronounce and the defendant to
know what he is called upon to answer and whether he may plead an acquittal
or conviction thereon., 33 Carterinvolved an appeal by the State from a finding
that Carter's guilty plea "was not voluntarily and knowingly entered. ' 3 The
defendant had been indicted under section 44-53-370 of the Code of Laws of
South Carolina for manufacturing methamphetamine, and the supreme court
held that counsel had properly advised Carter that his conviction under section
44-53-370 would require him to be sentenced more severely under the penalties
of section 44-53-375. 35 Section 43-53-375 does not define a separate crime, but
26. Granger,333 S.C. at 5, 507 S.E.2d at 324.
27. 324 S.C. 144, 478 S.E.2d 54 (1996).

28. Granger,333 S.C. at 5, 507 S.E.2d at 324.
29. Id. (citing Clair,324 S.C. at 145-46,478 S.E.2d at 55).
30. Granger,333 S.C. at 5, 507 S.E.2d at 324.

31. Clair, 324 S.C. at 146, 478 S.E.2d at 55.
32. 329 S.C. 355, 495 S.E.2d 773 (1998).
33. Id., 329 S.C. at 362-63, 495 S.E.2d at 777; see also State v. Perry, 87 S.C. 535,
539, 70 S.E. 304, 305 (1911) (stating that an "offense should be so plainly stated in the
indictment as to enable the Court looking alone to the indictment and the verdict to impose the
sentence prescribed by law").
34. Carter,329"S.C. at 359,495 S.E.2d at 775.
35. Id. at 361,495 S.E.2d at 776.
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only an enhanced punishment for a violation of section 44-35-370 involving
methamphetamine. 36 The court found the indictment in Carter sufficient,
despite the indictment's referral to section 44-53-370, because the plain
language of the body of the indictment notified the defendant that he was
charged with manufacturing methamphetamine.3 7
The indictment in Granger did not meet the standard for the
sufficiency of an indictment as stated in Carter.Although the defendant knew
he was pleading to trafficking in crack cocaine, he did not know he could be
penalized for trafficking 58.44 grams from an indictment merely stating, "more
than ten (10) grams,"3' as section 44-53-375 breaks down the appropriate
sanction according to quantity. 39 The indictment would have provided notice
with particularity if it had stated that Granger had trafficked between twentyeight grams and 100 grams. Further, the trial judge, without the additional
information of the"exact quantity of crack cocaine involved, would not have
known the proper sentence to pronounce from the indictment itself. The words,
"more than ten grams" could mean 100, 200 or 400 grams-all of which
require different mandatory sentences under section 44-53-375.'
Similarly, an indictment is arguably insufficient when it omits one of
the necessary elements of the offense. 4 If one regards the amount of crack
cocaine as an element of the offense, then at least a statutory range should have
been given in the indictment, rather than the minimal statutory language that
Granger trafficked in more than ten grams. The rule in State v. Butler42 is that
punishment is not part of the pleading charging a crime.43 In Butler the
defendant was indicted for murder, but the indictment did not include the
aggravating circumstance of rape.' The defendant argued that the failure to
allege the aggravating circumstancewas contrary to the requirement of notice
of the charges against him." In rejecting this argument the court stated that
"[n]otice is sufficient where the statutory requirements are met" and that
Butler's death sentence was for murder, not the aggravating circumstance of
rape." GrangerandButlerdiffer in three significant ways. First, the defendant
in Butler did not argue that he lacked notice of the murder charge for which he
was sentenced,47 whereas Granger based his post conviction relief motion on

36. Id.
37. Id. at 363, 495 S.E.2d at 777.
38. Granger v. State, 333 S.C. 2, 3, 507 S.E.2d 322, 323 (1998).
39. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-375(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998). This section
delineates different sanctions for the varying quantity ranges. See supra note 12.
40. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-375(C).
41. See State v. Mclntire, 221 S.C. 504, 509, 71 S.E.2d 410, 412 (1952).
42. 277 S.C. 452,290 S.E.2d 1 (1982).
43. Id. at 457, 290 S.E.2d at 3.
44. Id. at 456-57, 290 S.E.2d at 3.
45. Id.

46. Id. at 457, 290 S.E.2d at 4.
47. Id.
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the fact that he was denied such notice.4 Second, if courts interpret Butler
narrowly, the case stands only for the proposition that notice does not require
setting forth aggravating circumstances in an indictment for capital murder.
Unlike the murder statute inButler,49 section 44-53-375, whichwas controlling
in Granger,specifies different punishments depending on the amount the
defendant is alleged to have trafficked. 0 Finally, because the amount of
cocaine-not the criminal act-triggers the trafficking statute, s" the amount is
a significant aspect of the offense.
The court's reliance on State v. Towery s2 is also questionable. The
original indictment charging Towery with trafficking cocaine stated that he
"'did traffic in cocaine by willfully, unlawfully and knowingly having in his
possession a quantity ofcocaine.'" 3 Towery argued that because the original
indictment returned by the grand jury failed to state a quantity of cocaine, the
trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 4 In holding that the original
indictment was sufficient, the court stated simply that the requirements of State
v. Owenss" were met without offering further explanation. 6 However, there is
an important distinction between Towery and Granger. In Towery the
prosecutor amended the original indictment prior to trial to reflect that the
quantity of cocaine was "'in excess of 100 grams but less than 200 grams. ' '
Without that amendment, it is unclear whether the court would have upheld the
minimal language in the original indictment because the trial court would not
have known, from the indictment itself, the proper sentence to impose.58 The
words "a quantity of cocaine" could mean an amount less than ten grams,
which would constitute some lesser offense than trafficking. 9 Such a vague
determination could mean anything from trace amounts to 400 grams or more.
The court should not summarily dismiss the importance of quantity when
quantity is the determining factor in how much loss of liberty a defendant faces.
Although the exact amount may be difficult to ascertain when the indictment
is presented, at minimum, a statutory range-like the one in the amended

48. Granger v. State, 333 S.C. 2, 3, 507 S.E.2d 322, 323 (1998).
49. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
50. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-375(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
51. See State v. Peay, 321 S.C. 405, 408, 468 S.E.2d 669,671 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing
State v. Raffaldt, 318 S.C. 110, 117,456 S.E.2d 390, 394 (1995)).
52. 300 S.C. 86, 386 S.E.2d 462 (1989).
53. Id. at 87, 386 S.E.2d at 462 (emphasis added).
54. Id.
55. 293 S.C. 161, 359 S.E.2d 275 (1987). According to the Owens court, "[a]n
indictment is sufficient if the offense is stated with sufficient certainty and particularity to enable
the court to know what judgment to pronounce [and to enable] the defendant to know what he
is called upon to answer." Id. at 165, 359 S.E.2d at 277.
56. Towery, 300 S.C. at 87, 386 S.E.2d at 463.
57. Id. at 87, 386 S.E.2d at 462.
58. Or the proper "judgment to pronounce." See Owens, 293 S.C. at 165, 359 S.E.2d
at 277.
59. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-375(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
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indictment in Towery-should be stated for purposes of notice.
The court in Grangercited the Alabama case of Darby v. State6 for
the proposition that provisions of the trafficking statute relating to minimum
sentencing requirements did not involve elements of trafficking.6' nDarby the
defendant was charged with trafficking "'28 grams or more of cocaine." 62 The
defendant argued that the indictment did not sufficiently track the statute63
(similar to section 44-53-375(C) of the Code of Laws of South Carolina)
because it did not specify the exact quantity the defendant allegedly had in his
possession." The court rejected Darby's argument because it found that the
statute's subparagraphs specifying the punishments depending on the quantity
involved were merely minimum sentencing requirements and not elements of
the offense.65 Although the South Carolina Supreme Court cited Darby in
support of its ultimate holding in Granger,the Alabama court did not entirely
dismiss the significance of the quantity of drugs involved. In fact, the Darby
court suggested "[a] better practice might be for the indictment to specify the
paragraph of the trafficking statute alleged to have been violated in terms of
quantity."' Similarly, the form ofjury verdictwould specify the statutory range
of amount that the jury determines. 67 For instance, the form of verdict might
say, "We the jury find the defendant guilty of trafficking in more than 28 grams
but less than 100 grams of crack cocaine." While the exact quantity is not
given, this approach at least states the penalty range amounts, constituting
better notice than Granger received in the indictment against him. The
indictment charging Granger with trafficking could easily have been written to
give him notice of the penalty.
Finally, Grangerinvites criticism because it condones imprecision in
the drafting of an indictment. As previously stated, the indictment could have
been made more specific simply by specifying a range. 68 The court justified
Granger's increased sentence offifteen years-an increase of at least five years
if Granger had received the maximum penalty for a first offense of trafficking
in ten to twenty-eight grams69 -on grounds that the indictment satisfied

minimal standards of notice.70
The decision's injustice is also apparent in light of the result in Clair

60.
(Ala. 1987).
61.
62.
63.
1998).
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

516 So. 2d 775 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985), rev'd on othergrounds, 516 So.2d 786
Granger v. State, 333 S.C. 2, 4-5, 507 S.E.2d 322, 324 (1998).
Darby,516 So. 2d at 778.
ALA. CODE § 20-2-80(2) (1975), amended by ALA. CODE § 13A-12-231 (Supp.
Darby,516 So. 2d at 779.
Id.
Id. at 780.
Id.
Granger v. State, 333 S.C. 2,3, 507 S.E.2d 322,323 (1998) (emphasis omitted).
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-375(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
Granger,333 S.C. at 2, 4, 507 S.E.2d at 324.
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v. State.7 ' Clair,decided after Towery, explains that when an amendment to an
indictment increases the potential punishment, it changes the nature of the
offense and is improper.72 The only difference between Grangerand Clairis
that the prosecutor in Granger failed to amend the indictment to reflect the
greater quantity. If the prosecutor had taken that step, rather than the trial judge
finding the actual amount to be 58.44 grams, Clairwould have mandated a
different result because the amendment would have stripped the court of
subject matter jurisdiction.
B.

Authority of the SentencingJudge to Make FindingsofFact
at Sentencing

A second issue in Granger,but one the court did not address in its
opinion, is the court's implicit affirmance of judicial findings of fact at
sentencing. At Granger's plea hearing, the trial judge sentenced him upon
revelation that the actual quantity Granger trafficked was 58.44 grams of crack
cocaine.7 The opinion is silent as to whether the trial judge made any specific
finding of this fact on the record or what, if any, standard of proof he relied on
to determine the amount. Because the trial judge's actions in taking this plea
are similar to findings of relevant conduct?4 in the federal courts, the same
problems of the appropriate standard of proof for such findings are present and
in need of consideration.
Of course, trial judges have broad discretion at sentencing that "applies
to both the type of information considered and the length of sentence
imposed." ' In Williams v. New York7 6 the Supreme Court held that a
sentencing judge is not limited to the rules of evidence when determining the
proper sentence to impose upon a defendant.77 Likewise, South Carolina courts
have held that "[a] sentencing judge is not confined to the narrow issue of guilt.
His task within fixed statutory or constitutional limits is to determine the type
and extent of punishment after the issue of guilt has been determined. 7 8
However, the judge is not free to act "on surmise or suspicion," but must "listen

71. 324 S.C. 144, 478 S.E.2d 54 (1996).
72. Id. at 146, 478 S.E.2d at 55.
73. Granger,333 S.C. at 3, 507 S.E.2d at 323.
74. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 1B1.2(b) (1998) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
75. Robert E. Hanlon, Note, Hard Time Lightly Given: The StandardofPersuasion
at Sentencing, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 465, 480-81 (1988).
76. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
77. Id. at 247.
78. State v. Cantrell, 250 S.C. 376, 379, 158 S.E.2d 189, 191 (1967); see also State
v. Gulledge, 326 S.C. 220, 228, 487 S.E.2d 590, 594 (1997) (concluding that evidentiary rules
are inapplicable in a sentencing proceeding); State v. Franklin, 267 S.C. 240, 246, 226 S.E.2d
896, 898 (1976) (stating that the trial judge has wide discretion in determining the imposition
of sentences).
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and give serious consideration to any information material to punishment."'7 9
Although trial judges have broad discretion at sentencing, one must
focus on how the imposition of a harsher sentence based on the actual quantity
of cocaine trafficked in Grangeris analogous to the judge's consideration of
relevant conduct in the federal courts. In the federal system, relevant conduct
is defined as "conduct that is not necessarily the basis for the defendant's
conviction or charge, nor even an element of the offense of conviction, but may
nevertheless be used to determine the base offense level and applicable specific
offense characteristics."80 The guidelines instruct judges to account for factors
such as "the amount of drugs, property, or money" forming part of the same
common scheme or plan as the underlying offense "even if those amounts were
not part of the convicted offense."8
82 decided under the federal
United States v. Harrison-Philpot,
sentencing guidelines, illustrates the effect of relevant conduct at sentencing.
In Harrison-Philpotthe defendant was convicted of distributing sixty-seven
grams of cocaine.83 Harrison-Philpot appealed because the Government at trial
asserted as relevant conduct an actual amount of fifteen to 49.9 kilograms of
cocaine.8 4 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the sentencing judge
could apply a higher sentencing range and find, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the greater quantity existed."5 Likewise, the trial judge in
Grangersentenced the defendant to fifteen years based on the actual amount
trafficked, rather than the amount charged in the indictment. However, in
Granger,unlike Harrison-Philpot,there is no indication ofthe burden ofproof
by which the judge should have found the existence of the greater quantity. In
either of the above cases, had the defendants been tried on the relevant conduct
or actual amount, each would have had the benefit of the quantity being found
beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than by the preponderance of the evidence
or, worse, by no standard of proof. This difference necessitates examination of

79. Franklin,267 S.C. at 245, 226 S.E.2d at 897 (1976); see also United States v.
Tucker, 404 U.S. 443,446 (1972) (noting that the sentencing judge "may appropriately conduct
an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider,
or the source from which it may come").
80. Lauren Greenwald, Note, Relevant Conductand thelmpact ofthe Preponderance
StandardofProofUnderthe FederalSentencing Guidelines: A DenialofDue Process, 18 VT.
L. RFV. 529, 536 (1994) (citing GUIDELINES, supra note 74, § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A)). See ginerally
Kevin R. Reitz, SentencingFacts: Travesties ofReal-Offense Sentencing,45 STAN. L. REv. 523
(1993) (discussing "real-offense sentencing" and the lack ofconstitutional restraints and arguing
for "conviction-offense sentencing" as an alternative); William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer,
Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstoneof the FederalSentencing Guidelines,41 S.C. L. Rv. 495
(1990) (focusing on relevant conduct and its scope as well as the preponderance standard).
81. Greenwald, supra note 80, at 537 (citing GUIDELINES, supra note 74,
§ IBI.3(a)(2)).
82. 978 F.2d 1520 (9th Cir. 1992).
83. Id. at 1522.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1524.
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the constitutional issues regarding the proper standard of proof at sentencing
and whether there should be a standard in South Carolina.
1.

Three Choices

Courts often choose among three standards of proof: proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, clear and convincing evidence, and preponderance of the
evidence. 6 The highest standard, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is most
often reserved for criminal proceedings in which the Government seeks to
deprive a person of life or liberty." Because the accused has a strong interest
in preserving his life and freedom, the prosecution must carry a greater burden
of proof. This standard seeks to reduce errors by placing the burden of
persuading the fact finder of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt almost entirely
on the prosecuting party.8" The clear and convincing standard is less exacting
than beyond a reasonable doubt, although it "places the risk of nonpersuasion
more heavily on the plaintiff" than the preponderance of the evidence
standard. 9 For example, this standard is often used in fraud cases and civil
commitment proceedings." To prevail under the least stringent standard,
preponderance of the evidence, a plaintiffmust show that, more likely than not,
the allegations set forth in the complaint are correct.9' Preponderance of the
evidence is the standard most judges use in civil matters.92
Prior to the adoption of sentencing guidelines, courts "traditionally
heard evidence and made findings of fact.., without any prescribed standard
of proof."93 In fact, "[u]nder traditional rules of indeterminate sentencing...
trial courts have huge discretion to select punishment, and no burden to explain
their decisions."'9 Currently, South Carolina appears to follow the traditional
approach.95 In other states, however, findings of fact at sentencing are
determined by a standard of at least preponderance of the evidence.96 In the
federal system, the United States Sentencing Commission, after initially failing

86. Hanlon, supranote 75, at 490.
87. Boyce F. Martin, Jr., The CornerstoneHasNo Foundation:Relevant Conductin
Sentencing and the Requirements ofDue Process,3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 25, 33-34 (1993).
88. Hanlon, supra note 75, at 490.
89. Martin, supra note 87, at 32.
90. Id. at 32-33.
91. Id. at32.
92. Hanlon, supranote 75, at 490.
93. Martin, supranote 87, at 34 (footnote omitted).
94. Reitz, supra note 80, at 525 (footnote omitted).
95. See, e.g., State v. Franklin, 267 S.C. 240, 246, 226 S.E.2d 896, 898 (1976)
(reflecting the court's reluctance to disturb the sentence of the trial court and holding that "this
[c]ourt has no jurisdiction to review a sentence, provided it is within the limits provided by
statute for the discretion of the trial court ... and is not the result of prejudice, oppression or
corrupt motive").
96. See, e.g., Darby v. State, 516 So. 2d 775, 780 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986), rev'd on
other grounds, 516 So. 2d 786 (Ala. 1987).
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to specify a standard of proof to be applied at sentencing, has amended the
commentary in section 6A1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines to reflect its
approval of the preponderance standard. 97 Despite a 5-4 decision in McMillan
v. Pennsylvania, in which the Supreme Court upheld the preponderance
standard at sentencing,98 its application is not without criticism. 99
To understand why a standard of beyond preponderance of the
evidence should be required at sentencing, one must evaluate the rationale for
a higher standard of proof at trial. In In re Winship"' the Supreme Court held
that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required in juvenile
adjudicatory proceedings as well as criminal trials.' In that case the family
court judge found that the appellant, twelve years of age at the time, had stolen
money from a woman's purse. 2 Because New York law required only that
delinquent acts in adjudicatory proceedings be established by a preponderance
of the evidence, the judge found the appellant delinquent and ordered him to
training school for eighteen months despite the fact that "[t]he judge
acknowledged that the proof might not establish guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt."'0 3 In reversing, the Court focused on the importance of the role of the
reasonable-doubt standard as an "instrument for reducing the risk of
convictions resting on factual error."'° Regarding that role, the Court explained
that an "accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense
importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon
conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the
conviction."' 05 Because of these important interests, the Court held "that the
Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged. ''""s
Although criminal trials andjuvenile-adjudicationproceedings require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the lower standard-preponderance of the
evidence-is constitutionally permitted both for findings of fact and for
findings of the presence of relevant conduct under the federal Sentencing
Guidelines.0 7 Finding a fact or relevant conduct by a preponderance standard
"merely requires ajudge to find that it is more likely than not that the defendant

97. See GUIDELINES, supranote 74, § 6A1.3 commentary.
98. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986).
99. See Martin, supra note 87, at 35.
100. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
101. Id. at 368.
102. Id. at 359-60.
103. Id. at 360.
104. Id. at 363.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 364; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, (prohibiting states from
"depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw"); see also S.C.
CONsT. art I, § 3 (guaranteeing that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law").
107. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986).
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did engage" in such conduct."°8 Consequently, a defendant sentenced under this
lower standard "is denied the protection [to which] he or she would have been
entitled... had he or she been tried on the relevant conduct, namely, the guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt standard."'"
2.

The Supreme Court Examines the Preponderance
Standardat Sentencing

In McMillan v. Pennsylvania"° the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the preponderance standard at sentencing."' The case
involved a challenge to Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act
which mandated a minimum sentence of five years imprisonment for persons
convicted of specified enumerated felonies."' The judge at sentencing had to
determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, if the person used a firearm
during the commission of the felony." 3 Because the Act did not provide for
imposition of a sentence greater than that otherwise allowed for the underlying
offense, the Court was willing to allow the sentencing scheme." 4
However, the Court's primary reason for upholding the preponderance
standard in McMillan was the distinction it drew between sentencing factors
and essential elements of a crime." 5 Petitioners argued that because possession
of a firearm was an essential element of the offense for which they were being
sentenced, In re Winship required that this element be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt." 6 In rejecting this argument, the Court relied on the fact that
the Pennsylvania Legislature had expressly provided in the Mandatory
Minimum Sentencing Act that visible possession of a firearm was not an
element of the enumerated crimes, but a sentencing factor arising only after a
defendant has been found guilty of one of the listed offenses." 7 The Court also
denied that the Pennsylvania Legislature had evaded the due process
commands of In re Winship because the elements of the enumerated felonies
didnot change upon passage of the Act."' While refusing to decide "the extent
to which due process forbids the reallocation or reduction of burdens of proof
in criminal cases," the Court did caution that there are constitutional limits on
the state's power to distinguish sentencing factors from elements of the

1982).

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Greenwald, supranote 80, at 544.
Id. at 545.
477 U.S. at 79.
Id. at91.
Id. at 81; see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9712(a) (West 1982).
McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81; see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9712(b) (West

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

McMillian,477U.S. at 89.
Id. at 85-86.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 85-86.
Id. at 89.
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substantive offense. 1 9
Although the Supreme Court in McMillan upheld the preponderance
standard for the factual finding of visible possession of a firearm at sentencing,
Grangeris distinguishable in aspects that could necessitate a higher standard
of proof. First, in McMillan the determination that the defendant possessed a
firearm during commission ofthe crime did not result in "a sentence in excess
of that otherwise allowed" for the underlying offense. 2 ' Further, the statute
gave "no impression of having been tailored to permit the visible possession
finding to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense."''
In Grangerthe trial court's finding that the defendant possessed 58.44
grams (rather than ten to twenty-eight grams for which the defendant argued
he had been indicted) resulted in an increased prison sentence. While the
fifteen-year sentence did not exceed the maximum sentence for a first offense
of trafficking more than twenty-eight grams," it did exceed the maximum
sentence for a first offense of trafficking in ten to twenty-eight grams of crack
cocaine by at least five years.m" Even if the finding of the quantity of cocaine
trafficked is not the tail wagging the dog, its importance in sentencing
determinations cannot be overlooked.
The Court in McMillan also justified the preponderance standard by
finding that a determination ofpossession of a firearm was merely a sentencing
factor and not an element of the offense.' 24 While the South Carolina Supreme
Court would likewise find that subsections in the trafficking statute relating to
quantity are not "elements of the offense,"' Justice Stevens, dissenting in
McMillan, voiced concern that the states, in defining what factors are elements
of a crime to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, could circumvent the In re
Winship standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for every essential
element of the offense through broad definitions of offenses. 2 6 Justice Stevens
gave the following example:
A legislative definition of an offense named
"assault" could be broad enough to
encompass every intentional infliction of
harm by one person upon another, but
surely the legislature could not provide that

119. Id. at 86.
120. Id. at 82.
121. Id. at 88.
122. See S.C. CODEANN. § 44-53-375(C)(2)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998) (providing
for a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than 25 years for a first offense of trafficking
more than 28 but less than 100 grams).
123. See id. § 44-53-375(C)(1)(a) (providing for a maximum term of imprisonment
of not more than 10 years for a first offense of trafficking more than 10 but less than 28 grams).
124. 477 U.S. at 88.
125. See Granger v. State, 333 S.C. 2, 5, 507 S.E.2d at 324 (1998).
126. 477 U.S. at 102 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

13

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:931

only that fact must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt and then specify a range
of increased punishments if the prosecution
could show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant robbed, raped,
or killed his victim "during the commission
of the offense."127
The above scenario resembles what happened in State v. Towery. 128
Because the court in Towery found the indictment adequate even though the
indictment failed to specify the quantity of cocaine,'" the Granger court
likewise upheld the indictment and the subsequent enhancement of Granger's
sentence by a judicial finding of the actual quantity of crack cocaine. 3 If
quantity is not an essential element of the trafficking offense, had Granger
elected to go to trial for that offense, everything except the actual amount
would have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict him.
Justice Stevens, finding fault with this approach, submitted an alternative that
would satisfy due process. According to Justice Stevens, "if a State provides
that a specific component of a prohibited transaction shall give rise both to a
special stigma and to a special punishment, that component must be treated as
a 'fact necessary to constitute the crime' within the meaning of our holding in
In re Winship.' 3' Applying Justice Stevens's approach to Granger, the
subsections specifying enhanced punishments depending on quantity are
arguably components that give rise to a "special punishment." Although finding
the amount beyond areasonable doubt wouldbe constitutionally required under
In re Winship (if quantity were an essential element of the offense), for
efficiency purposes South Carolina courts will more likely apply a lower
standard of proof, if any, to such findings of fact at sentencing.
The use of the preponderance standard at sentencing is not without
justification. Some decisions favoring preponderance are based on the
judgment that the convicted defendant's interest in sentencing decisions is not
as crucial as the interest in the initial determination of guilt. 3 2 Balancing the
defendant's interest in receiving an appropriate sentence against the
government's interest in avoiding the burdens of meeting a higher standard of
proof, many courts have found the lowest degree of procedural protection to be
sufficient.33 However, that balance is upset when a defendant's liberty interest

127. Id.
128. 300 S.C. 86, 386 S.E.2d 462 (1989).
129. Id. at 87, 386 S.E.2d at 462-63.
130. Granger,333 S.C. at 4, 507 S.E.2d at 324.
131. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 103 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. Steven M. Salky & Blair G. Brown, The PreponderanceofEvidence Standard
at Sentencing, 29 AM. CliM. L. Rv. 907, 914 (1992).
133. Id.
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is "directly related to the appropriate resolution of disputed facts. 134 For
instance, in Granger the determination of the greater sentence directly
depended on the trial judge's finding of the amount ofcrack cocaine trafficked.
Clearly, Granger's liberty interest was greater than the State's interest in not
bearing a burden of proof at sentencing.
3.

The Matthews Alternative

Because both the lack of a standard of proof and the preponderance
standard are inadequate to satisfy a defendant's due process rights at
sentencing, some courts and commentators have turned to the balancing test
announced inMatthews v. Eldridge3 ' for guidance in selecting the appropriate
standard. 3 6 Although the test's aim is to determine the process due when the
government tries to deprive an individual of a property right,'37 the test has
been used in other contexts 3 and could be applied to situations like that
presented in Granger.Matthews dealt with whether the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause requires an evidentiary hearing before the termination of
social security benefits. 39 In making this determination, the Court crafted the
following test involving a comparison of the following: (1) the nature of the
private interest affected by the official action; (2) the risk of error through the
procedures employed and the probable value of additional safeguards; and (3)
"the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail."'' 4 Applying this test to the situation presented in Matthews, the
Court concluded that the interest in uninterrupted social security benefits did
4
not necessitate an evidentiary hearing to "comport [fully] with due process.' '
The first factor in applying the Matthews test to sentencing "is the
individual's interest in sentencing."' 42 Because a defendant's liberty is at stake
during sentencing, this interest is understandably strong. Some argue that this
interest has been elevated by the creation of sentencing guidelines, particularly
in the federal system, where resolution of disputed facts affects the adjustment
of offense levels and changes the presumptive sentence. 43 Similarly, the
sentencing judge's determination of the greater quantity of crack cocaine in
Grangerresulted in a longer prison sentence than the defendant had anticipated
and, hence, had a significant effect on his liberty interest.

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Salky & Brown, supra note 132, at 911-12.
Id. at911.
Id.
Matthews, 424 U.S. at 323.
Id. at 335.
Id. at 349.
See Hanlon, supra note 75, at 493.
See Salky & Brown, supra note 132, at 914.
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The second factor in the Matthews test, the interest in safeguarding
against the risk of error, favors greater due process protections at sentencing.
If a preponderance standard is used at sentencing to protect the defendant's
liberty interest, then both the prosecution and the defense "share the risk of
error equally.'"" However, both the imbalance in resources between the
government and an individual and the fact that the rules of evidence do not
apply at sentencing increase the risk of error.'45 The possibility of prejudicial
error from hearsay and uncorroborated evidence at sentencing is also
heightened because that evidence often comes from sources, such as law
enforcement personnel and prosecutors, who are likely to view the defendant
in the most negative light, or from codefendants motivated by self-serving
interests to shift the blame to the defendant.
In cases like Grangerin which sentencing courts do not rely on any
particular standard of proof to make their determinations, the defendants could
bear more than half the risk of error. Because the trial court is not required to
articulate its findings of fact by any standard, defendants enjoy little protection
against erroneous findings. Without a standard, a sentencing judge is likely to
accept whatever the prosecutor states as fact without further proof. Even if that
standard were preponderance of the evidence, arguments against the
preponderance standard in the federal sentencing process caution that it would
not be enough protection for the defendant.
The final factor of the Matthews test is the government's interest,
which includes the financial and administrative burdens of a heightened
procedural requirement. Requiring due process protections of trial at sentencing
would place "an additional burden on the prosecutorial staff and on the
judiciary."'" Indeed, judicial economy favors a lesser degree of proof.'47
However, as one commentator argued, "the most rigorous standard of proof at
sentencing, that of beyond a reasonable doubt, would likely result in more
carefully prepared and documented presentence investigations, the content of
which would more easily withstand scrutiny and thus reduce the incidence of
frivolous challenges."'" From that perspective, a higher standard of proof
might better serve the state's interests.
Application of the Matthews test to Grangerleads to the undeniable
conclusion that the defendant had an enhanced liberty interest in the sentencing
process, that he bore a greater risk of error through the lack of any requisite
standard of proof, and that the State would not be overly burdened by
complying with a standard beyond preponderance of the evidence. Even if
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt on findings of fact at sentencing is
too great a burden on the State, it does not follow that a standard of clear and

144. Greenwald, supra note 80, at 553.

145. Id.
146. Hanlon, supra note 75, at 498.

147. Id.
148. Id. (footnote omitted).
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convincing evidence would be any more taxing. For example, courts already
apply that standard to deprivations of liberty for involuntary commitment to
mental institutions'49 and for termination of parental rights. 0 Considering the
important liberty interests at stake in sentencing, criminal defendants deserve
no less.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The South Carolina Constitution guarantees that no person will "be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."' 5' Due
process requires that criminal defendants receive sufficient notice of the
charges against them. Unfortunately, the Grangerdecision fails to live up to
this constitutional mandate. The standards for the sufficiency of an indictment
were not met because the indictment alleging that Granger trafficked more than
ten grams neither gave the defendant notice of the charge he had to meet nor
allowed the sentencing judge to know what sentence to impose absent the
"revealed" information at sentencing about the actual quantity. Further, by
relying on a case such as Towery, in which the court upheld minimal statutory
language, the Granger court weakened the importance of delineating a
statutory quantity range in an original indictment. Because the amount is
directly related to the loss of liberty facing a defendant, it should not be
eliminated from allegations in indictments for drug trafficking, distribution, or
possession.
Considering how easily the indictment could have included a statutory
range of twenty-eight to 100 grams to give Granger notice, the result is harsh.
Alternatively, had the indictment been amended to reflect the greater quantity
of 58.44 grams, the amendment would have been improper under Clair.
Practically, it might be wise for defense counsel to seek an amendment when
an original indictment does not specify a statutory quantity range. Of course the
better practice would be for the prosecution, when drafting indictments, to at
least refer to the statutory subsection relating to the quantity range and
corresponding penalty.
Clearly, due process requires that the prosecution at trial meet its
burden ofproving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. For sentencing hearings (or
guilty pleas), the standard for satisfying due process is less certain. Although
the Granger court implicitly upheld the trial judge's finding of fact at
sentencing, it did not indicate whether the trial judge should have made that
determination by any particular standard of proof. Because South Carolina
courts have yet to address this important concern, a look to other states and to
the federal system is necessary for guidance. Although the Supreme Court in
McMillan upheld the preponderance of the evidence standard for findings of

149. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,432-33 (1979).
150. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982).

151. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3.
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fact at sentencing, there are persuasive arguments in favor of a higher standard
of proof. While recognizing that sentencing judges have broad discretion to
consider hearsay and other matters at sentencing, requiring them to make
determinations which have a significant effect on the sentence by a standard of
proof of at least clear and convincing evidence would not be overly taxing.
Stacey Coleman-McKinney
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